


**Secret**

25X1

HR



# STAFF NOTES:

## Soviet Union Eastern Europe

State Department review completed

**Secret**

25X1

June 13, 1975


170

25X1

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001100340001-3

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001100340001-3


SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE



25X1


*CONTENTS*

June 13, 1975



25X1

Yugoslav Court Throws the Book at Tuzla Cominformists. . . . .	3
Ambassador Stoessel Speaks with Kapitsa. . . . .	5
Ceaurescu in Brazil and Mexico . . . . .	7



25X1

**Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt**

Yugoslav Court Throws the Book at  
Tuzla Cominformists

The trial of six cominformists in Bosnia opened with the surprising announcement that the six are also charged with supporting the illegal, pro-Soviet party formed in Montenegro a year ago. Each of the accused faces charges that could lead to a sentence of nearly 25 years imprisonment.

The Bosnia group includes some well-known ex-partisans and at least one former high-level official of Tito's secret police. Some higher level Bosnians, including a past member of the prestigious Council of the Federation, were also implicated, but not arrested.

25X1

The decision to link the Bosnia group to the larger conspiracy in Montenegro suggests that the Yugoslav regime now intends to dramatize the group's foreign connections.

25X1

The change in signals may reflect the Yugoslavs' displeasure over Soviet efforts to press ahead with preparations for the European Communist conference. Belgrade started to dig in its heels on the conference in April after the Soviets and their loyal followers showed they were still interested in a binding programmatic document. Tito could be using the implied threat of another polemic of Cominformist subversion to gain concessions from Moscow at the next working group meeting that is slated to open in East Berlin on July 1.

For the moment, Belgrade is allowing the local press in Bosnia to take the lead in the case. Before

June 13, 1975

long, however, the major news media can be expected to launch a concerted attack on Cominformists. There is also a good chance that another unofficial whispering campaign questioning Soviet intentions toward Yugoslavia will be launched.

25X1

25X1

June 13, 1975

-4-

Ambassador Stoessel Speaks with Kapitsa

25X1 Ambassador Stoessel had a long conversation on June 9 with the Soviet Foreign Ministry's chief Far East officer, Mikhail Kapitsa. Kapitsa made many of the same points he and his deputy Rogachev had made to US embassy officers over the past few weeks [redacted] The Soviets' main purpose seems to be to tell the US that China cannot be trusted and that there is little likelihood that the USSR and China will repair their relations at any time. The latter point carries with it the implication that the US can count on Moscow to be supportive if the US takes a tough line with the Chinese.

As in earlier conversations, Kapitsa claimed that the radicals are gaining strength within the Chinese leadership. He said that Teng Hsiao-ping, who is not normally placed in the radical camp, will emerge on top in the immediate post-Mao/Chou period, but he expressed the view that the new leaders may create provocations against the USSR in order to maintain national unity in the succession period. Kapitsa argued that any Soviet gesture to these leaders could well be self-defeating. The implication was that Moscow neither expected nor would attempt to work for a rapprochement in the post-Mao period. This is at variance with Soviet public statements of hope that the "true internationalists" will eventually gain power in China and return the country to the path of friendship with the USSR. Although the Soviets are far from sanguine about the implications for them of the demise of Mao (and Chou), it is highly unlikely that they are as certain as Kapitsa suggests that things will get tougher in the post-Mao period.

In elaboration of his basic theme, Kapitsa said:

--China hopes to build an anti-Soviet alliance with Japan. He warned that while

June 13, 1975

the Soviet Union was the target today, tomorrow the target might be the US.

--Nothing new had been offered by the Chinese during the border talks held by Deputy Foreign Minister Ilichev in Peking from mid-February to early May. Kapitsa added, however, that not since 1960 had the border been as quiet as it is now.

On North Korea, Kapitsa said that Kim Il-song had wanted to visit the Soviet Union on his recent tour, but that the Soviets had turned him down. Autumn or winter, he said, would be preferable from the Soviet point of view. Kapitsa claimed that there are "no grounds for anxiety" in Korea, denying that P'yongyang has any aggressive intent at this time.

25X1

June 13, 1975

-6-



Ceausescu in Brazil and Mexico

Economic topics dominated President Ceausescu's talks in Brazil and Mexico from June 4 to 11, but Ceausescu did impress his hosts with Romania's determination to pursue an independent foreign policy. He also discoursed extensively--sometimes beyond comfortable limits--on Romania's Latin heritage.

In Brasilia, Ceausescu signed a number of economic agreements, including a pledge of a \$150-million Romanian credit for Brazilian metallurgical projects, an agreement on pharmaceutical production, and a \$10-million credit from the Romanian commercial bank. Brazil agreed to supply 25 million tons of iron ore to Romania between 1975 and 1985. The Soviets are now Romania's main supplier of this vital raw material, and Bucharest is evidently trying to reduce its dependency.

On the lighter side, US diplomats in Brasilia report encountering numerous Brazilian Foreign Ministry officials "in an emotional state approaching fury" because of the Romanians' seemingly never-ending demands for changes in schedule and itinerary. As one official put it, these problems were particularly galling because "Ceausescu not only invited himself, but insisted on coming." The Brazilians were also annoyed by security men masquerading as cooks, hair dressers, and tailors. One Brazilian was heard to say, "The Romanians are even more Latin than we are!"

In Mexico, Ceausescu signed 11 scientific, economic, and cultural agreements. The two countries also issued a "solemn declaration" stressing the rights and freedom of all states in international relations.

June 13, 1975

-7-

25X1

25X1

Mexican President Echeverria was particularly impressed by Romania's "energetic search" for independence from the USSR, and by Mrs. Ceausescu's knowledge of political issues and her influence over her husband. A Mexican Foreign Ministry official described the Romanians as the "toughest and most devious" negotiators he had ever encountered. He added that dealing with the Romanians caused more frustration than dealing with the Soviets.


25X1



June 13, 1975

-8-

25X1



**Secret**



**Secret**